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The RICO Enterprise Controversy:
Judicial Legislation Versus Judicial
Interpretation
I. Introduction
In 1970, a Congress which had become increasingly con-
cerned about the growth of organized crime and its infiltration
of legitimate business' enacted the Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act.' This extremely controversial act
combined two bills introduced in the Senate in 1969. S. 1623,
the "Criminal Activities Profits Act," introduced by Senator Ro-
man Hruska of Nebraska, would have prohibited the investment
into any legitimate business enterprise affecting interstate and
foreign commerce of income derived from criminal activities.' S.
1861, the "Corrupt Organizations Act of 1969," introduced by
Senator John McClellan, would have proscribed the infiltration
of management of legitimate organizations by racketeers.4 These
two bills produced Title IX, "RICO," of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970.'
Section 19626 sets out the substantive RICO offenses. Sec-
tion 1962(a)7 prohibits the acquisition of an interest in an enter-
1. See, e.g., U.S. PRESIDENr'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFO RCE Mr AND THE ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT. ORGANIZED CRIME (1967).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as "RICO"].
3. S. 1623, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1969).
4. S. 1861, 91st Cong., 2d Seas. (1969).
5. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 101-1301, 84
Stat. 922.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly
or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an
unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the
meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or
indirectly any part of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the estab-
lishment or operation of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open
market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or
participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not
1
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prise engaging in or affecting interstate commerce through prof-
its derived from a patter of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt. Section 1962(b)8 prohibits the ac-
quisition of an interest in an enterprise by means of a pattern of
racketeering activity or loansharking. Section 1962(c)" proscribes
the use of racketeering or loansharking in the conduct of such
enterprise.10 The term "enterprise" is the critical element com-
mon to these RICO substantive offenses."
Judicial opinion, however, attempted to vary its scope.
Some circuit courts1 2 took a broad view of which "enterprises"
were covered, finding that combinations for clearly illegal pur-
poses came within the scope of RICO's prohibitions. Other cir-
cuit courts took a narrow view,13 and found Congress's intent to
be unlawful under the subsection or if the securities of the issuer held by the
purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or her accomplices many
pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such
purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding of any
one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or
more directors of the issuer.
Id.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indi-
rectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
Id. (emphasis added).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
Id. (emphasis added).
10. The final § 1962 offense is § 1962(d) (1976), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of
subsections (a), (b) or (c) of this section.
Id.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976) defines "enterprise" as any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals asso-
ciated in fact although not a legal entity.
12. Hereinafter referred to as the "broad view courts." See, e.g., United States v.
Elliot, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978). The court held that
"enterprise" encompasses not only legitimate businesses but also enterprises which are,
from their inception, organized for illegal purposes.
13. Hereinafter referred to as the "narrow view courts." See, e.g., United States v.
Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979).
The court held that the term "enterprise" encompasses only legitimate associations.
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol2/iss1/4
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be to proscribe only incursions into otherwise legitimate
business.
The RICO "enterprise" controversy warrants a close analy-
sis because of the judicial tendency to legislate rather than to
interpret statutes. This analysis will reveal that one view is the
product of judicial legislation, while the other is the product of
judicial interpretation.
This comment will begin by elucidating judicial reasoning
supporting each view. It will then critique each view, closely
scrutinizing judicial use of statutory interpretation, legislative
history, and intent, concluding that the narrow view is the pref-
erable interpretation of "enterprise."
II. The Cases
A. The Broad View
In United States v. Elliot," the defendants were charged
with agreeing to participate, directly and indirectly, in the con-
duct of the affairs of an "enterprise" whose purposes were to
commit thefts, fence stolen property, illegally traffic in narcotics,
obstruct justice, and engage in other criminal activities. Reduced
to its bare essentials, the substantive section 1962(c) RICO vio-
lation was restated as
[b]eing associated with a group of individuals who were associ-
ated in fact, [defendants] each directly and indirectly partici-
pated in the group's affairs through the commission of two or
more predicate crimes."
The defendants maintained that there was no group of indi-
viduals associated in fact - no enterprise - in whose affairs they
could have participated.16 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit disagreed, beginning its analysis by citing
two of its own opinions, United States v. Hawes1 7 and United
States v. McLaurin." It noted that Congress had given the term
14. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
15. Id. at 897.
16. Id.
17. 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976).
18. 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1977).
1982]
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"enterprise" a very broad meaning, 19 and that the Act clearly
encompassed "not only legitimate businesses but also enter-
prises which are from their inception organized for illicit pur-
poses."20 The court then noted that the "illegitimate business =
enterprise" dispute stemmed from dictum in Iannelli v. United
States,21 where the Supreme Court stated:
[RICO] seeks to prevent the infiltration of legitimate business op-
erations affecting interstate commerce by individuals who have
obtained investment capital from a pattern of racketeering
activity.
22
The Elliot court discounted this, saying that there was no
indication that the dictum was intended to describe fully the
ambit of the Act's coverage, that the Act drew no distinction
between legitimate and illegitimate businesses, and that the leg-
islative history s supported the broad application inherent in the
19. United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d at 479.
20. United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d at 1073.
21. 420 U.S. 770 (1975).
22. Id. at 787 n.19.
23. The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly
sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of
dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force,
fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power
through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan
sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of
narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3)
this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate
business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes;
(4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Na-
tion's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, in-
terfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce,
threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation
and its citizens; and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in
the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally
admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to
bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because
the sanctions and remedies available to the government are unnecessarily limited
in scope and impact.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process,
by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crimes.
Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922
(1970).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol2/iss1/4
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words of the statute.2
The Elliot court then stated that Congress had clearly ex-
tended the statute to include other than legitimate businesses.
The statute extended beyond conventional business organizations
to reach "any ... group of individuals" whose association, how-
ever loose or informal, furnishes a vehicle for the commission of
two or more predicate crimes. The statute demands only that
there be association "in fact" when it cannot be implied in law.
There is no distinction, for "enterprise" purposes, between a duly
formed corporation that elects officers and holds annual meetings
and an amoeba-like infra-structure that controls a secret criminal
network.2 5
The court concluded that the evidence demonstrated "the
existence of an enterprise, a myriopod criminal network, loosely
connected but connected nevertheless."' 6
In United States v. Altese,27 the defendants were charged
with conducting a large scale gambling business through a pat-
tern of racketeering and collection of unlawful debts, as defined
in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1),"a (5),' 9 and (6).s The district court81
24. United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d at 897 n.17.
25. Id. at 898.
26. Id. at 899. See Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis of
RICO, 65 IowA L. REv. 837 (1980). Professor Bradley summarized the Elliot holding.
The Elliot court created two new federal crimes - a subsection 1962(c) RICO
violation and a subsection 1962(d) RICO conspiracy - from nothing more than a
series of simple statutory violations. The element of agreement, necessary to dis-
tinguish the conspiracy charge from the substantive offense, is missing. Proof of
the substantive offense automatically makes out a conspiracy, according to the
court, because one of the elements of the substantive offense, the pattern, satisfies
the agreement element of the conspiracy.
Id. at 879 (footnote omitted).
27. 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (1976):
(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnap-
ing, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other
dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by impris-
onment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the
following provisions of title 18, United States Code: section 201 (relating to brib-
ery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to
counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment), if the act
indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement
from pensions and welfare funds), sections 391-94 (relating to extortionate credit
transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information),
section 1314 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section
5
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agreed with the defendants that section 1962(c)"2 applied only to
legitimate enterprises financed through patterns of racketeering
activity or the collection of unlawful debts, and not to an illegal
gambling business.8 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed, beginning its statutory analysis by examining the lan-
guage of the Act. The court noted the frequent use of the word
"any" in conjunction with "enterprise", and determined that
such repetition precluded the elimination of illegitimate busi-
ness from the ambit of the Act."
1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of
criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local
law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery,
or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to in-
terstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to un-
lawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal
gambling business), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation
of stolen property), sections 2341-46 (relating to trafficking in contraband ciga-
rettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is in-
dictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions
on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to em-
bezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving fraud connected with
a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture,
importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in nar-
cotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976) provides that "pattern of racketeering activity" re-
quires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurs after October 15,
1970, the effective date of this chapter, and the last of which occurs within ten years
(excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeer-
ing activity.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (1976):
(6) "unlawful debt" means a debt (A) incurred or contracted in gambling activity
which was in violation of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivi-
sion thereof, or which is unenforceable under State or Federal law in whole or in
part as to principal or interest because of the law relating to usury, and (B) which
was incurred in connection with the business of gambling in violation of the law of
the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or the business of lend-
ing money or a thing of value at a rate usurious under State or Federal law, where
the usurious rate is at least twice the enforceable rate . ...
31. United States v. Altese, No. 76-1008, No. 902 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (Mishler, C.J.).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976). See supra note 9.
33. The district court held that Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act, of
which § 1962(c) is a part, "deals with the problem of infiltration of legitimate business by
persons connected with organized crime" and was not designed by Congress "to cover
the types of activity charged in the indictment." United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d at 106.
34. Id.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol2/iss1/4
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[W]e find ourselves obliged to say that Title IX in its entirety
says in clear, precise, and unambiguous language - the use of the
word "any" - that all enterprises that are conducted through a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debts fall
within the interdiction of the Act.30
The court closed this part of its analysis by noting that
Congress could have inserted words of restriction if it intended
any other meaning. On the contrary, "it inserted a clause provid-
ing that the provisions of Title IX be liberally construed to ef-
fectuate [RICO's] remedial purposes." s Therefore, the court
maintained that it could not hold that "Congress did not say
what it meant nor mean what it said. ''13
The Altese court, supported by its own holding in United
States v. Parness," noted that it was obliged to construe the Act
liberally to include illegitimate business because if the new penal
prohibitions did not extend to such business there would be a
loophole in the law. Noting, moreover, that three other circuits"
had reached the same result, the Altese court held that RICO's
"enterprise" included illegitimate business. 0
35. Id. The court looked to Webster's Dictionary for a definition of "any."
"Any" is defined in Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition, as
follows: "Indicating a person, thing, etc., as one selected without restriction or
limitation of choice, with the implication that everyone is open to selection with-
out exception; all, taken distributively; every; used especially in assertions with
emphasis on unlimited scope.
Id. at 106 n.4.
36. Id. Pub. L. No. 91-452, Title IX § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 provides:
The provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes.
37. United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d at 106. For an identical interpretation of the
liberal construction clause, see Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66
CORN LL L. REv. 167 (1980).
38. 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1974).
39. United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United
States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 US. 925 (1975).
40. United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d at 107.
In a well written dissent, Judge Van Graafeiland strongly criticized the majority's
reliance upon "any" to expand the "enterprise" definition. He noted that "[Tihe end
result of the majority's expansive interpretation of § 1962(c) is to accord the word "en-
terprise," intended by Congress to by synonymous with commercial business, parity with
the term "conspiracy." 542 F.2d at 108.
Without a clear and precise direction from Congress, we have created a statute
making it a federal felony for any group, association or conspiracy to violate any
7
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In United States v. Rone,4 the defendants had been con-
victed of forming an enterprise to commit various acts of extor-
tion, and in association with and in the conduct of that enter-
prise, conspiring together to commit, and committing, three
murders. The defendants claimed that the evidence did not es-
tablish a RICO "enterprise."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
disagreed, beginning its analysis by stating that defendant's con-
tention was without merit.
A reading of § 1962(c) and Title IX in its entirety indicates that
any enterprise which is conducted through a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity falls within the statute.42
The Rone court noted that Congress's broad legislative
scheme did not include an intent to limit the Act to "legitimate"
or "illegitimate" business. The RICO "enterprise" definition was
"all-encompassing," and its "broad and unrestricted use... ap-
pears throughout Title IX."
4
"
Given the presence of the wholly unencumbered term "any enter-
prise" throughout the statute, we hold that its use in § 1962(c)
manifests an intent to proscribe the conduct of specified activities
through a pattern of racketeering activity, regardless of the type
of enterprise involved."'
The Rone court then cited Elliot4' and Altese 4 to support
its view. Further, the court felt that an examination of the legis-
lative history was "inappropriate" since the statute was not am-
biguous; examination of the legislative history would reveal
state's murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or nar-
cotics statutes in any manner which utilizes or affects interstate commerce. The
disruptive effect of our holdng on federal-state relationships and on the limited
enforcement and judicial resources of the federal government is every bit as great
as that of the expansive interpretation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, con-
demned by the Supreme Court. [Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971)].
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Note that Judge Van Graaffeiland has noted that "we have created a statute." It is
the constitutional province of the courts to interpret, not create, legislation.
41. 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979).
42. Id. at 568.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978).
46. United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976).
[Vol. 2:73
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nothing contrary to the court's position.4 The court noted:
[a] significant purpose of the legislation was to address the
problems of infiltration of legitimate business by persons con-
nected with organized crime [footnote omitted], [but] [t]he recog-
nition of this particular purpose hardly leads to the conclusion
that § 1962 applies only in the case of an actual infiltration of a
legitimate business. Rather, acceptance of the broad definition of
"enterprise" used by Congress fully comports with the stated con-
gressional goal of arresting the infiltration of regular commerce by
organized crime. By prohibiting the functioning of illegitimate en-
terprises, participants in them are denied the sources of income
used to invest in legitimate businesses.48
Therefore, including illicit enterprises in RICO's ambit will
prevent criminal infiltration into legitimate enterprises "in the
first instance by denying racketeers the sources of their invest-
ment funds."' "
B. The Narrow View
In United States v. Sutton,60 the defendants had been con-
victed under RICO of conducting the affairs of an "enterprise"
affecting interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering
primarily involving possession and distribution of heroin, and
transporting and receiving stolen property.
The defendants contended that "RICO was intended to pro-
scribe only the infiltration and operation of legitimate enter-
prises through patterns of racketeering activity, a situation
which the government conceded was not involved in the case.""
The government, relying entirely upon the text of the statute,
47. United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d at 569.
48. Id.
49. Id.
Judge Ely's dissent strongly criticized the majority's reliance upon the word "any"
and its reluctance to examine the legislative history:
[W]e must look to the provisions of the whole law so that we give effect to the
legislative will. . . . "It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of
the statute and yet not within the statuue, because not within its spirit, nor within
the intention of its makers."
United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d at 574 (citations omitted) (quoting Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
50. 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979).
51. Id. at 264. See supra notes 6-12.
1982]
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argued that it did not distinguish between legitimate and illegit-
imate enterprises; that "enterprise" was defined broadly in sec-
tion 1961(4); and that the defendants were a "group of individu-
als associated in fact" and had each committed the required
number of racketeering offenses while in that association.
To summarize the government's theory of the case, the evidence
showed the existence of a "single enterprise-operated for the pur-
pose of making money from repeated criminal activity."'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
began its statutory analysis of the section 1961(4) "enterprise"
definition by using a dictionary meaning of "enterprise." The
court found that individuals and groups do not become "enter-
prises" except in relation to some acts they perform.53 The stat-
utory definition, the court concluded, did not say what "that
something is."" The Sutton court disagreed with the govern-
ment's view that that "something" is provided by the individu-
als racketeering activity. The Sutton court immediately detected
a flaw in the government's argument: its "deceptively literal
treatment" of the term "enterprise" read the term entirely out
of the statute.55 RICO then simply proscribes "patterns of racke-
teering activity." The Sutton court stated that "[Congress]
would not have opted for so complex a formulation if the legisla-
tive purpose had been merely to proscribe racketeering, without
more."" The plain meaning indicates that "enterprise" must be
"larger than, and conceptually distinct from, any 'pattern of
racketeering activity' through which the enterprises 'affairs'
might be conducted. 5 7 The court attacked the Elliot," charac-
terization of "criminal enterprise, '59 stating that
greater precision than that is required if the statute is not to vio-
late "the first essential of due process of law" by forbidding "the
doing of an act in terms so vague that [persons] of common intel-
52. United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d at 265.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d at 266.
57. Id.
58. United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978).
59. "An amoeba-like infra-structure that controls a secret criminal network." United
States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d at 897-98.
[Vol. 2:73
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ligence [would] necessarily [have to] guess at its meaning and dif-
fer as to its application. . ... *
The court, therefore, maintained that "definite standards"
are required if RICO is to apply to "criminal enterprises." The
court started its search for these "standards" by examining the
legislative history,61 concluding that it did not resolve the "crim-
inal enterprise" issue but that it did lend support to defendants'
contention that section 1962(c)"' was intended to be limited to
"legitimate enterprises. '"63 The Sutton court also found that the
Altese construction" "seriously misconceives this legislative his-
tory[;] to argue. . . that limiting RICO to the corruption of le-
gitimate enterprises 'does not make sense since it leaves a loop-
hole for illegitimate businesses to escape its coverage.'""
Illegitimate business is already adequately proscribed elsewhere,
and the defendants "quite properly point out that they did not
engage in the aggravated form of racketeering activity for which
RICO was exclusively designed.""
The court then examined the structure of the statute as a
whole. Finding that section 1962(a)67 was clearly directed at le-
gitimate enterprises, the court determined that subsections (b)
and (c) read in pari materia should also be so directed."
Proceeding with its analysis, the court felt that it was most
important to give content to each element of the RICO § 1962
offenses. The government's interpretation, which reads the "en-
terprise" element out of the statute, failed in this regard; the
defendants' interpretation did not. The court also noted that its
"only alternative. . . to accepting [defendants'] position on the
scope of § 1962(c) [was] to rewrite the statute completely,"" en-
grafting upon section 1961(4)70 standards to warn specifically of
60. United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d at 266 (citations omitted).
61. See supra note 23.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
63. United States v. Sutton 605 F.2d at 267. See supra note 23.
64. United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976).
65. United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d at 268.
66. Id.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976). See supra note 7.
68. United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d at 268-69. Statutes in pari materia are to be
construed together.
69. Id. at 269.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976). See supra note 11.
1982]
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the proscribed activities. The court concluded:
Although Congress has declared that RICO's provisions should be
"liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose, "[the
court would not] read that directive as authorizing [them] to
write a new and substantially different law.71
The Sutton court then used two criminal statutory con-
struction canons to buttress its argument. First, "ambiguity con-
cerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in
favor of lenity. . . unless the legislature has spoken 'plainly and
unmistakably' to the contrary. . . .,,' Since the legislative his-
tory7 3 spoke "plainly and unmistakably" for the defendants'
view, "the maxim applies with special force."' 4 Second, "unless
Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to
have significantly changed the federal-state balance. '" 5 Accept-
ance of the government's construction would substantially alter
the federal-state balance regarding state criminal jurisdiction
"by making a federal felon out of 'any individual' or any mem-
ber of a 'group' who has committed any two of the broad range
of state offenses denominated 'racketeering activity' under §
1961(1).''76 Since an alternative construction (i.e., the defen-
dants'), supported by the legislative history,77 was available, the
Sutton court refused to take such a step and held for the
defendants.7
71. United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d at 269. See supra note 36.
72. United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d at 269. (citations omitted).
73. See supra note 23.
74. United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d at 269.
75. Id. at 270 (citations omitted).
76. Id.
77. The Senate Report, the House Report, the Justice Department's recommen-
dation, the concurring view of Senator Scott, the views of the House dissenters,
and discussions on the floor of the Senate and House of Representatives before
passage of OCCA-70, clearly express an intent limited to attacking organized
crime's incursions into legal enterprises.
Comment, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies
For "Criminal Activity," 124 U. PA. L. REv. 192, 204-05 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
78. United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d at 270. The court "held that an 'enterprise'
within the meaning of the statute is 'any individual, partnership, corporation, association
... and any union or group of individuals associated in fact,' that is organized and act-
ing for some ostensibly lawful purpose, whether formally declared or informally recog-
nized. Section 1962(c) is violated whenever any person associated with such an enterprise
conducts it's affairs, i.e., undertakes any activity on behalf of or relating to the purposes
[Vol. 2:73
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Another recent case taking a narrow view of the RICO "en-
terprise" is United States v. Anderson.79 There defendants, Ar-
kansas county judges Anderson and Mooney, had devised a
scheme to defraud and to obtain money from their county trea-
suries by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representa-
tions, and promises, thereby allegedly violating § 1962(c) and
(d).s" The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
agreed with the defendants' assertion that the district court
erred in applying RICO. s"
The Anderson court began its "enterprise" analysis with an
examination of interpretative case history.8' It noted that after
Parness a broad construction of the term "enterprise" had be-
come entrenched, but not without some criticism.88 Next, the
court began examining the statutory language, noting that the
of the enterprise, by committing at least two criminal acts constituting a 'pattern of
racketeering' as defined in section 1961(5)." Id.
79. 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980).
80. Id. at 1362.
Count I of the indictment charges violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), alleging that
Leslie Anderson and Leonard Mooney were persons associated with an enterprise
engaged in, and the activities of which affected, interstate commerce, namely each
of the said defendants and Paul A. Baldwin were associated in fact to defraud,
and to obtain money by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations
and promises from Sharp and Fulton Counties, Arkansas, and the people of said
counties, and the said defendants, Leslie Anderson and Leonard Mooney, did
knowingly and willfully conduct and participate directly and indirectly in the
conducting of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern or racketeering activity
as defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1961. Count II of the indict-
ment charges violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d), alleging that Leslie Ander-
son and Leonard Mooney, defendants herein, being associated with an enterprise
engaged in and whose activities affect interstate commerce, as defined in Section
1961 of Title 18, United States Code, that is the association in fact with Paul A.
Baldwin, d/b/a The "Lisco" Company, did knowingly and willfully conspire, con-
federate and agree together and with each other, to conduct and participate in,
directly and indirectly, conduct of subject enterprise's affairs, through a pattern of
racketeering activity.
Id. (emphasis added).
81. Defendants Anderson and Mooney argued that the term "enterprise" does not
encompass an illegal association that is proved only by facts which also establish the
predicate acts constituting the "pattern or racketeering activity." United States v. An-
derson, 626 F.2d at 1365.
82. The Anderson court cited a long case history tracing the origin of the broad
interpretation of "enterprise," beginning with United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). United States v. Anderson 626 F.2d at
1363-64.
83. See supra notes 40 and 49.
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statute "is particularly complicated, and the various elements of
the offense intricately interralate." The court stated that these
"structured relationships control the disposition of [the] case."
The court then focused on "enterprise" and "pattern of racke-
teering activity."
The term "enterprise" must signify an association that is sub-
stantially different from the acts which form the "pattern of rack-
eteering activity." A contrary interpretation would alter the es-
sential elements of the offense as determined by Congress."
The court disposed of the government's argument that the
liberal use of the word "any"'8 required the broadest possible
interpretation argument by stating that all of the "anys" pre-
cede the word "enterprise" which is defined in section 1961(4).
It is this "enterprise," as defined,, which controls the scope of
the statute, and not the word "any."88
The court, noting the syntactical form of section 1961(4),
then applied a traditional maxim of statutory construction and
found that the general words were ejusdem generis" to the pre-
vious words defining types of groups. The "meaning of the gen-
eral phrase, 'group of individuals associated in fact although not
a legal entity,' is controlled by the preceding specifically enu-
merated examples." 90 The Anderson court then ascertained the
common aspects among the enumerated examples of an enter-
prise by examining section 1962.91 Noting that an overly broad
construction of the term "enterprise" rendered that element of a
section 1962(c) offense equal to the "pattern of racketeering" el-
84. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1365.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 34 and 35.
88. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1366.
89. Where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a
particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be considered in their
widest extent, but are to be held as applying to persons or things of the same general
class or kind as those specifically mentioned. The court noted that "the ejusdem generis
rule is not applicable when the context of the statutory provision manifests a contrary
intention, the wording and composition of RICO, as well as the legislative history and
motivating policies of the Act strongly apply the applicability of the rule." Id. at 1366.
90. Id. The "enumerated examples" are "individual, partnership, corporation, asso-
ciation or other legal entity. . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976).
91. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1366.
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ement, the court followed the "universal rule of construction
*. . that courts should give effect to all the words of a statute in
order to discover the true intention of the legislature, [and
therefore] the government's interpretation of the phrase 'group
of individuals associated in fact' appears contrary to legislative
intent." 2
The court then noted that the "enterprise" element was the
focal point of the offense"s and that its elimination "would pose
difficult problems relating to the fifth amendment's guarantee
against double jeopardy.""
The "enterprise" element provides an essential ingredient in the
constitutionality of the composition and structure of a section
1962(c) offense. Because a defendant may be separately prose-
cuted for the two predicate crimes only by requiring proof of an
"enterprise" that engages in or has activities affecting interstate
or foreign commerce does section 1962(c) require proof of a fact
other than facts required to prove the predicate crimes.es
92. Id. at 1367. The government contended that two individuals committing acts of
racketeering activity would constitute a "group of individuals associated in fact."
93. Id.
The definition of "pattern of racketeering activity" provided in section 1961(5)
merely "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity." Since the term "racke-
teering activity" is defined simply by listing particular offenses questions have
arisen concerning the nature of the relationship between the two predicate crimes.
Although the ordinary and natural meaning of the phrase "pattern of racketeering
activity" would seem to require that the predicate acts relate in some manner,
section 1961(5)'s requirement of the commission of two of the predicate crimes has
been held to be clear on its face, and no further evidence has been held necessary
to establish a pattern. To ensure that the predicate acts possess some degree of
interrelationship, some courts have used the "enterprise" element to establish a
coherent crime by holding that the only relationship between the predicate crimes
necessary for a section 1962 violation is that they must both relate to the same
enterprise. Thus the "enterprise" element stands as the focal point of the offense.
This use of "enterprise" element to provide a relationship between the two
predicate crimes aids to contain the prohibitions of RICO rather than expand
them to cover purely sporadic criminal activity. This result of the statutory struc-
ture does not appear serendipitous, but rather seeems to be product of careful
planning.
Id. (citations omitted).
94. Id.
95. Id. (citations omitted).
The double jeopardy clause "protects against a second prosecution for the same of-
fense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction. And it protects against multiple punishment for the same offense." North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). The Blockburger test emphasizes the ele-
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Continuing, the court noted that the "racketeering activity"
offenses 6 reflected an economic orientation, "reinforcing the
view that Congress intended RICO to aim at the target of organ-
ized crime's infiltration of the American economy."' The civil
remedial provisions of section 1964,1s based upon the antitrust
laws, strengthened this view."9
ments of the two crimes: "[ilf each requires proof of a fact that the other does not, the
Blockburger test is satisfied, notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered
to establish the crimes." lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n. 17 (1975). Thus,
under RICO, if the "pattern of racketeering activity" can constitute an "enterprise",
then it appears that one may be prosecuted and convicted twice for the same crime, once
on the federal level, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976), and once on the state level (for racke-
teering proscribed on the state level).
96. See supra note 28.
97. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1980).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976) provides:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and
restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapeter [18 U.S.C. § 1962] by issuing
appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest
himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable
restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but
not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor
as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign
commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due
provision for the rights of innocent persons.
(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. In any
action brought by the United States under this section, the court shall proceed as
soon as practicable to the hearing and determination thereof. Pending final deter-
mination thereof, the court may at any time enter such restraining orders or
prohibitions, or take such other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory
performance bonds, as it shall deem proper.
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of sec-
tion 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States dis-
trict court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
(d) A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United States in any crimi-
nal proceeding brought by the United States under this chapter shall estop the
defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any
subsequent civil proceeding brought by the United States.
Id.
99. United States v. Anderson, 626 F. 2d at 1368. An analysis of the civil purpose of
RICO leads to the conclusion that:
Title IX is designed to maintain the integrity of business enterprises supply-
ing lawful public needs. Congress may decide eventually to extend the use of civil
remedies to combat more indirect economic effects of criminal activity, unrelated
to particular business enterprises. But it has not yet done so under Title IX.
Id. (citations omitted).
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The Anderson court then attacked the Elliot 0 decision be-
cause it "displaced traditional precepts concerning concerted
criminal activity, and freed the Government from the strictures
of traditional conspiracy doctrine."' O' The court found nothing
in the statute to suggest that Congress intended to do such a
thing. 0 12 Further, the court refuted the Altese "Liberal Con-
struction Clause" argument by citing due process arguments 08
and the lenity rule which requires resolving ambiguities in penal
statutes in favor of lenity.1'0 The court ended this part of its
discussion by stating:
[a]s the preceding discussion of the language and structure of
RICO indicates, the Government simply cannot rely solely on a
"plain meaning" interpretation of the term "enterprise." Further-
more, an expansive definition of the term "enterprise" will not
necessarily effectuate the remedial purpose of RICO to eliminate
100. United States v. Elliot, 511 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978).
101. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1368.
The enterprise charged in the . . . indictment assumes that organizations
formed solely for illicit purposes and having no legitimate business structure or
connection fall within RICO's definition of enterprise. This permits proof of the
enterprise element by evidence indicating a simple association to commit the pat-
tern of racketeering activity.
Id. See supra note 26.
102. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1369.
Congress's inclusion of subsection (d) implies that it did not intend to create
a separate species of conspiracy law by including in its definition of the term "en-
terprise" a "group of individuals associated in fact." It indicates that Congress
intended to establish two distinctly separate offenses in subsections (c) and (d). If
a simple criminal conspiracy to commit the predicate crimes were to fulfill the
"enterprise" element of a section 1962(c) violation, then a conspiracy to commit a
1962(c) violation would be defined as when a person, associated with a conspiracy
to commit criminal acts, conspires to conduct those criminal acts. The awkward-
ness and duplication inherent in the structure of this articulation of the offense
should be sufficient to suggest we search for an alternate interpretation.
Id. (citations omitted).
103. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1369. "Due process requires that crimi-
nal laws be written to give fair notice of the conduct they prohibit." Id. (citation omit-
ted). Altese used the liberal construction clause to find a broad interpretation. See supra
text accompanying notes 39-40. A broad interpretation necessarily leads to a certain
"vagueness" in giving notice of what RICO prohibits. The Sutton court attacked the
Elliot holding with a due process argument. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
104. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1370. "Also, the principle of statutory
construction, referred to as the rule of lenity, requires resolving ambiguities in penal
statutes in favor of lenity" Id. (citations omitted). The Sutton court also used this argu-
ment. See supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
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the infiltration of racketeers into our business economy. Instead,
it will inject federal prosecutors into the realm of offenses tradi-
tionally considered to be of a local character. 05
Next, applying an "established rule" from Broom's Legal
Maxims,le the court found that "Congress's careful solicitude
regarding federal-state relations concerning gambling, evident in
Title VIII, would effectively be eradicated by an overly broad
construction of Title IX, RICO. We cannot assume Congress was
this careless."1 7 Further, the court thought it "should be wary
of any argument that Congress implicitly altered the traditional
division of responsibilities between federal and state
governments."108
Finally, finding that the relevant legislative historye 9 sup-
ported its view, the Anderson court held:
Congress intended that the phrase "a group of individuals as-
sociated in fact although not a legal entity," as used in its defini-
105. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1370 (citations omitted).
106. "[1It is an established rule, in construing a statute, that the intention of the
lawgiver and the meaning of the law are to be ascertained by viewiing the whole and
every part of the Act." United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1370 (citations omitted).
(quoting BROOM, LnGAL MAXIMS 585 (1882).
107. In Title VIII of the Organized Crime Control Act, Congress carefully in-
cluded provisions designed to preclude infringement upon local law enforcement
officials unless the gambling activity could be considered of sufficient magnitude
to warrant federal intervention. The creation of the RICO offenses does not reflect
any awareness of disruption in the balance between federal and state criminal
prosecution, yet an expansive definition of the term "enterprise" permits greater
and more pervasive intrusion upon state and local law enforcement authority than
would federal entry into the isolated area of gambling. The predicate crimes that
can establish a pattern of racketeering activity encompass a broad range of crimi-
nal acts, and the effective elimination of the "enterprise" element of the offense
would permit federal prosecution of any group of individuals associated to commit
two or more predicate acts.
United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1370 (citations omitted).
108. Id.
109. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1371.
The pertinent [legislative) history relating to this purpose can be concisely
summarized into three basic categories: (1) broad statements emphasizing the
need to curb the growth of racketeering, (2) frequent references to the desire to
stop the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime and the absence
of any reference to any illegitimate association as an enterprise that would be in-
cluded within the meaning of that term, and (3) congressional sensitivity to intru-
sion upon state law enforcement authorites.
Id. (citations omitted).
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tion of the term "enterprise" in section 1961(4), to encompass
only an association having an ascertainable structure which exists
for the purpose of maintaining operations directed towards an ec-
onomic goal that has an existence that can be defined apart from
the commission of the predicate acts constituting the "pattern of
racketeering activity."' "'
III. The Case Reasoning Analysis
A. Statutory Interpretation
The broad view courts""' and the narrow view courts'11 each
"statutorily interpreted" section 1961(4). The broad view courts,
focused upon "congressional silence;" while the narrow view
courts focused upon statutory language and structure.
1. The Broad View
The broad view courts primarily focused upon "congres-
sional silence." The minimal attention paid to statutory lan-
guage and structure focused upon the wrong language. The Al-
tese court noted just the repetitive use of the word "any," and
used Webster's definition of "any" to support its argument.113
Rone took this argument one step further by focusing upon the
expansive expression "any enterprise."' 1 4 These arguments are
flawed because "enterprise" is defined, for RICO's purposes, in
section 1961(4) - it is not just "any" or "any enterprise" but any
"enterprise" as defined in section 1961(4).1 The basic issue is
the interpretation of this "definition," not of its modifiers.-
Two broad view courts, Elliot and Rone, focused upon "en-
terprise's" "broad meaning." The Elliot court stated con-
clusorily that "enterprise" "clearly encompassed illegitimate
businesses as well as conventional businesses." ' Defining "en-
terprise" to include "criminal enterprise" wrote the RICO "en-
110. Id. at 1372. The Sutton court had a different holding. See supra note 78.
111. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
113. United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039
(1977). See supra notes 34-35 and accompaanying text.
114. United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979). See supra note 44 and
accompanying text.
115. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 19, 20 and accompanying text.
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terprise" right out of the statute.
The Rone court also employed variations of the "broad
meaning" argument, noting that the "enterprise" definition was
"all encompassing." ' Further, the Rone court noted the fre-
quent broad and unrestricted use of the term "enterprise," a va-
riation on its "any enterprise" argument.'18 Again, such analysis
misses the issue. It does not matter how many times "enter-
prise" is used in the statute. The word still must be used as de-
fined by section 1961(4).119
Two broad view courts, Elliot and Altese, also emphasized
Congressional silence in their analysis. In Elliot, the court stated
that the Act did not distinguish between legitimate and illegiti-
mate businesses. The Elliot court felt free to include "criminal
enterprise" in section 1961(4) because Congress did not specifi-
cally exclude this broad scope. Further, the Elliot court felt it
resolved the 1annelli footnote problem by the same approach.
The footnote did not specifically exclude the Elliot "criminal en-
terprise" from the statute; therefore, it may be included in sec-
tion 1961(4).12o It should not matter whether Congress distin-
guished between legitimate and illegitimate businesses. Congress
did mention legitimate businesses; it did not mention illegiti-
mate businesses. Holding that section 1961(4) includes "criminal
enterprises" clearly crosses the fine line dividing judicial inter-
pretation and judicial legislation.
The Altese court in a variation of the Elliot "Congressional
silence" approach noted that RICO lacked words of restriction
and contained a liberal construction clause. 1' 2 This argument
also misses the issue. The question is not a balance between lack
of restrictive words and the liberal construction clause. As noted,
the liberal construction clause may only be used "to effectuate
[RICO's] remedial purposes. ' 122 The question then is whether
construing "enterprise" through the liberal construction clause
to include illegitimate businesses "effectuates [RICO's] remedial
purposes." Further, the Act as written should be liberally con-
117. United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d at 568.
118. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
119. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 36, 37 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 36.
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strued. Altese's terse look at section 1961(4) leaves serious
doubts as to whether such examination was conducted.23
In sum, the three broad view courts, using "statutory inter-
pretation," have skirted the issue. The Rone court, after briefly
stating that the definition of enterprise was "all encompassing,"
focused upon the number of "enterprises" used and its "any en-
terprise" argument. The Altese court, like Rone, focused on the
word "any," but to such an extent that the court thought it rele-
vant to examine Webster's definition of "any." Altese then fo-
cused upon the lack of Congressional restriction, filling that vac-
uum with the liberal construction clause. The Elliot court
treated section 1961(4) tersely with its "broad meaning" charac-
terization. Then, using the lack of legitimate-illegitimate distinc-
tions and the lannelli footnote, Elliot found a "criminal enter-
prise" in section 1961(4). By never really focusing upon section
1961(4), thereby omitting the initial step of any statutory analy-
sis, the Elliot, Altese, and Rone courts devised a broad defini-
tion of the term "enterprise."
2. The Narrow View
The narrow view courts, Sutton and Anderson, focused pri-
marily upon the statutory language and structure of RICO.
These courts noted that the statute was complex,1 " that content
must be given to each element of the statutory offense, 1 "6 that
the structure of the statute must be examined as a whole, 36 and
that, unless Congress clearly conveys a purpose to the contrary,
the statute will not be deemed not to have significantly altered
the federal-state balance.1 27
The Sutton court and Anderson court came to the same
conclusion: the RICO "enterprise" must be an entity concep-
tually distinct from the predicate acts which form the "pattern
of racketeering activity. 132 Anderson's statutory interpretation
arguments are stronger than those in Sutton, however, because
123. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 56, 84 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 69, 92 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 67-68, 91, 92 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 75, 106-08 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 57, 86 and accompanying text.
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the Anderson court focused upon the entire legislative scheme
rather than merely upon RICO itself.'" Section 1961(4) was ex-
amined both alone and in the context of its surrounding envi-
rons. The Anderson court's statutory analysis, found through
application of the ejusdem generis principle that the trouble-
some broad language was limited by the previous specific exam-
ple,180 was flawed. The specific examples of section 1961(4) de-
scribe legal entities, while the broad language mentions non-
legal entities."' It is then inconsistent to limit the broad lan-
guage with the specific examples of section 1961(4). The court,
after examining section 1961(4), looked at section 1962 to see
how "enterprise" was used, determining that "commonality
among enumerated examples of section 1962 enterprises" is pre-
ferred. 3 2 Since section 1962(a) clearly talks about legitimate en-
terprises, enterprise for section 1962(b), (c), and (d) should be
similarly construed. The Anderson court then noted that the ec-
onomically oriented racketeering offenses reinforced the view
that Congress intended RICO to aim at the infiltration of legiti-
mate businesses."3 3 Further, the Anderson court, examining the
RICO statute in the context of the entire Organized Crime Con-
trol Act of 1970, found that Congress's sensitivity to federalism
questions in Title VIII should reflect a similar attitude for Title
IX, RICO.'" Here the Anderson court adapted the congressional
silence approach of the broad view courts by noting the lack of
explicit Congressional sensitivity to federalism questions in Title
IX.1 38 5 It could have been an intentional omission.
The Sutton court did not concentrate upon the statutory
language as much as did the Anderson court. s6 In fact, Sutton,
unsatisfied with the section 1961(4) definition, introduced a sup-
plemental dictionary meaning of "enterprise.1 387 This definition
129. Compare supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text with supra notes 84-92 and
accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 89, 90 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
132. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1366. See supra notes 91-92.
133. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., supra notes 23, 24 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 129.
137. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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is as irrelevant as was Altese's supplemental "any" definition.'"
Sutton did, however, examine the structure of section 1962 as a
whole, concluding, as did Anderson, that "enterprise" should be
read as in section 1962(a).18'
Both courts cited the liberal construction clause, but each
handled it differently. The Sutton court felt that the clause did
not give a court a license to rewrite the statute in order to up-
hold the government's position. "10 Inconsistently, the Sutton
court did feel it could rewrite section 1961(4) with Webster's
"enterprise" definition.' Further, the basic issue is not one of
rewriting section 1961(4), but of "liberally construing [section
1961(4)] to effectuate [RICO's] remedial purposes. '"4 There-
fore, the government's broad construction could have been given
to section 1961(4) by "liberally construing" it, not rewriting it.
The Anderson court noted that it did not know how much
deference it should give the liberal construction clause. By citing
arguments involving the Rewis lenity rule and due process the
court did seek to negate any effect of the clause. "4 These argu-
ments make little sense upon close examination. More deference
should be given to the statutory liberal construction clause than
any outside rule. Further, the Anderson court is not focusing
here upon the relevant issue. The question is not whether the
rule of lenity will temper the use of the liberal construction
clause, but whether the government's "enterprise" contention
"effectuates [RICO's] remedial purposes." The statute should al-
'ways be internally construed first. Then, if needed, outside
sources should be used. On balance, the Sutton treatment of the
liberal construction clause is more defensible.14 4
In conclusion, the narrow view courts "statutory interpreta-
tion" primarily focused on statutory language and structure, and
not on Congressional silence and irrelevant language. Their con-
clusions were not always well founded, but at least these conclu-
sions were based upon close examination of the relevant statu-
138. See supra notes 34, 35 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 67, 68 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 137.
142. See supra note 36.
143. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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tory language.
B. The Legislative History
1. The Broad View
The broad view courts gave RICO's legislative history little
deference. When they did, they again avoided the relevant
issues.
The Elliot court stated that "the legislative history sup-
ported the broad application inherent in the words of the stat-
ute."1 " The court substantiated this statement, however, by cit-
ing the Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose,
ignoring more relevant legislative history which did not specifi-
cally support its views." 6 This writer believes "broad applica-
tion" does not necessarily mean "enterprise" includes illegiti-
mate businesses. Further, the statement did not exclude
illegitimate businesses from the coverage of the Act; again, Con-
gressional silence prevails. The Elliot court should have looked
beyond the Congressional Statement into the relevant legislative
history.
The Rone court stated that examination of the legislative
history was inappropriate since section 1961(4) was unambigu-
ous and extremely broad.1" The Rone court, however, could not
have determined from the face of the statute that Congress's
"broad legislative scheme" did not include an intent to limit
RICO. Further, Rone stated that nothing contrary to its position
would be found if the legislative history was consulted.14 8 This is
just another example of the broad view court's reliance upon
Congressional silence, since the legislative history does not spe-
cifically exclude illegitimate businesses. The Altese court, for
unstated reasons, did not consult the legislative history.
2. The Narrow View
The narrow view courts, in examining the legislative history,
145. United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d at 897 n.17. See supra notes 24, 25 and accom-
panying text.
146. See supra note 23.
147. United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d at 569.
148. Id.
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continued their focus upon what had been said. The Sutton
court noted that the legislative history did not solve the govern-
ment's "criminal enterprise" problem, but it did support the de-
fendants' contention that section 1962(c) was limited to "legiti-
mate enterprises. '"1 9  The Anderson court continued its
exhaustive analysis by breaking down the legislative history into
three basic categories.150 It then noted that "[the] legislative his-
tory [did] not provide a definitive statement of Congressional in-
tent concerning the term 'enterprise,' but it [did] help illuminate
the intended meaning of the statutory language." 151 In contrast
to the broad view courts, the Anderson court did not use the
lack of a definitive Congressional statement on "enterprise" as
evidence of intent not to exclude illegitimate business."5'
C. Interpretational Effects
The circuit courts also discussed the potential effects of
adopting a particular view of the scope of RICO. In some cases,
the ultimate decisions were influenced by these considerations,
in others they were not.
The Altese court, in adopting the broad view, noted that if
"enterprise" was not deemed to include "illegitimate businesses"
there would be a loophole in the law.1" This argument fails
when it is noted that the "illegitimate business" talked about by
Altese are already sufficiently proscribed by other criminal
statutes.'"
The Rone court, in adopting the broad view, stated that
their decision effectuated Congressional intent in the first in-
stance by preventing organized crime from making any money to
invest.155 This analysis assumes that organized crime will invest
its money in legitimate business every time. Potential criminal
activity has never been an excuse for its proscription.
The Sutton and Anderson courts, in adopting their narrow
149. See supra notes 72, 73 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
151. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1371.
152. See, e.g., supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
155. United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d at 569. See supra note 46 and accompanying
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views, cited federalism '1 6 and due process problems 7 with
adoption of the broad view. The Anderson court, however, cited
one additional problem: the adoption of the broad view might
pose serious fifth amendment double jeopardy problems. ' " A
careful examination will show that Anderson is only raising the
specter of a "possible" problem. The missing ingredient in the
Anderson analysis of the issue is that there is no guarantee that
a second prosecution for the same crime will take place. Only if
a second prosecution is attempted will there be a problem. The
adoption of the broad view will not pose double jeopardy
problems; the second prosecution will.
IV. Conclusion
The broad view courts, in fashioning an interpretation of
section 1961(4), chose not to focus on the specific statutory lan-
guage and structure of the Act. Rather, the broad view courts
focused on what has been termed "Congressional silence" and on
irrelevant statutory language.
In contrast, the narrow view courts focused upon the spe-
cific statutory language and structure of the Act. In addition, the
narrow view courts considered many more factors, notably citing
the effects of adopting or not adopting their view.
When courts employ "Congressional silence" in statutory
interpretation, they are stepping into the province of the legisla-
ture and stepping out of the province of the judiciary. Obvi-
ously, this poses separation of powers questions. The courts are
not empowered to legislate but to interpret what the legislature
has written. It is extremely difficult to "interpret" what was
written if a court focuses on "Congressional silence." When
courts focus upon the specific statutory language and structure,
they are "interpreting" rather than "legislating." "Congressional
silence" may become a secondary factor in interpreting a partic-
ular statute, but it should not be allowed primacy over specific
statutory language and structure.
156. See supra notes 75, 106-08 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 60, 103 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 94, 95 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 2:73
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol2/iss1/4
RICO ENTERPRISE CONTROVERSY
In view of the above analysis, the narrow view adopted by
the Anderson and Sutton courts is the acceptable judicial "in-
terpretation" of the RICO "enterprise." 15'
Kirk Patrick Thornton
159. The United States Supreme Court decided, in United States v. Turkette, -
U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 2524 (1981), that the term "enterprise" as used in RICO encompasses
both legitimate and illegitimate businesses. Id. at 2527-34. An analysis of that decision,
however, is beyond the scope of this article.
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